A round the world, well-resourced governments seek to censor the Internet. Censorship is driven by governments' desires to control access to information deemed politically or socially sensitive, or to protect national economic interests. For example, in China, performing Internet searches for information on Tiananmen Square reveals no information about the events in 1989, and communication platforms run by companies outside China, such as Gmail and Twi er, are among those that are routinely blocked. Although China's "Great Firewall" is perhaps the best known example of Internet censorship by a nation-state, similar controls are enacted in Turkey, Iran, Malaysia, Syria, Belarus, and many other countries. (An excellent survey of the censorship policies by various governments around the world is provided by the Open-Net Initiative; opennet.net.)
In this article, we focus on the technical underpinnings of automated censorship and of the network tra c obfuscation tools aimed at circumventing it. By automated censorship, we mean government-deployed or -mandated network monitoring equipment typically installed at ISPs. ese systems detect and disrupt the ow of censored information without any direct human involvement and are applied broadly to enforce government policies over all citizens. is di ers from targeted approaches to taking down Internet content, such as the US government's takedown of the Silk Road, which was an Internet marketplace for illicit goods such as drugs and weapons.
Background: From Censorship to Protocol Obfuscation
In this article, we use terms like "censor," "adversary," and "sensitive ow" repeatedly. To aid understanding, we provide a summary of such key terms in Table 1 . e technical means of automated censorship assumes that the censor enjoys privileged access to network infrastructure. Governments typically have this via direct or indirect control of ISPs. In the security community, this is called an on-path adversary: it's on the path of network packets between the user seeking to access sensitive content and the provider of that content (for example, a webserver).
Tra c Identifi cation Methods
Network censors face two main tasks: to accurately identify network tra c that carries or a empts to Via deep-packet inspection. The success of proxy systems in practice has led censors to deploy new deeppacket inspection (DPI) mechanisms that identify traffic based on information deeper inside the network packets. For example, application-layer content carried in (unencrypted) packet payloads can divulge usergenerated data, such as keywords within search URLs. For example, China's Great Firewall blocks traffic containing blacklisted keywords.
In reaction to DPI, modern circumvention tools encrypt content to proxies, preventing this kind of keyword search. The result has been that sophisticated modern censors now use DPI to attempt to identify and block traffic created by circumvention tools. For example, China used DPI to detect Tor connections by looking for a specific sequence of bytes in the first application-layer message from client to server. This sequence corresponds to the TLS ciphersuites that Tor clients selected, which were unlike the other TLS implementations selected. As another example, Iran used DPI to determine the expiration date of TLS certificates. At the time, Tor servers used certificates with relatively near expiration dates, while most commercial TLS servers chose expiration dates that were many years away.
These blocking policies used fairly sophisticated information about the circumvention tool-the particular implementation of TLS-being carried in packet payloads. But even a crude scan of application-layer content can discover that standard protocols (for example, SSH and TLS) are being transported. This might be enough to trigger insensitive blocking or logging of source/destination IP addresses for more detailed analysis or later action.
Network Traffic Obfuscation
The use of DPI to perform tool identification motivated the circumvention tool community to seek countermeasures, culminating in an entire area of research and development: network traffic obfuscation. The goal is to force DPI-using censors to abandon attempts at protocol identification, because accurate identification at scale requires prohibitive resources, for example, by developing tools whose traffic can reliably force DPI to misclassify the traffic as that of a nonblacklisted tool. brevity, in the remainder of the article we focus primarily on passive attackers. So far, we've spoken mostly about the capabilities part of the threat model. In terms of the goals, the typical assumption is that censors minimally want to accurately classify traffic as either targeted (for application of policy) or not. Accuracy has two facets. The first is a high true-positive rate, meaning that the fraction of targeted traffic marked as such is close to one. The second is a low false-positive rate, meaning that the fraction of nontargeted traffic incorrectly marked as targeted is close to zero. Obfuscation tools are often said to be unobservable if they can cause sufficiently low true-positive and high false-positive rates. What constitutes sufficient error rates, however, is largely unknown. Tools with the potential to induce high false-positive rates are preferred because censors will be less likely to block them. Sensitivity to collateral damage. Collateral damage occurs when a censor's detection mechanisms suffer from false positives, leading them to mislabel network flows as associated to a blacklisted tool, protocol, or content when, in fact, the flow is not. Why should censors be sensitive to collateral damage? The answer is highly context dependent, varies over time, and is ultimately a question of sociopolitical factors. Iran's February 2012 censorship campaign is an example of insensitive censorship because the vast majority of TLS traffic was almost certainly not used for circumvention or bound for hosts deemed offensive by the regime. We note that this particularly broad censorship policy lasted only briefly, and that it's typical for censorship policies to change, in terms of targets and sensitivity, over time.
Obfuscation Approaches
Censors' DPI use has inspired researchers and activists to explore various countermeasures aimed
We focus on network traffic obfuscation in the remainder of this article.
We want to emphasize that our focus on obfuscation doesn't belie the importance of other aspects of censorship circumvention. IP-and DNS-based filtering are still more prevalent than DPI-based mechanisms, and circumventing such filtering remains a challenge in practice. Ultimately, circumvention requires a variety of mechanisms that work in concert to defeat a censor, and a system is only as good as its weakest link.
Threat models. A threat model is a particular combination of censor capabilities and goals. We provide only informal description of threat models for the purposes of this article. We emphasize that the threat models presented here apply only to gathering information from network flows (IP information, application-layer content, and so on) and not to the censoring actions (blocking or otherwise disrupting the communication) that this information enables. Information might be gathered by using passive or active techniques.
A passive technique simply observes traffic flows. One high-profile example of passive techniques occurred during the February 2012 anniversary of the 1979 Iranian revolution. The Islamic Republic of Iran mounted a large-scale censorship campaign, blocking various IP addresses associated with anticensorship tools, such as torproject.org, and using DPI-based identification of TLS network flows. 5 An active technique modifies existing packet contents or injects completely new packets. Examples of active attacks that manipulate connections by modifying or dropping specific packets have appeared in the academic literature. 6 Although far less common than passive techniques, active techniques have been used by the Chinese government to identify Tor proxies. 7 Table 2 lists examples of passive and active attacks. For Figure 1 . Proxy-based censorship circumvention. A client connects to a proxy server that relays its traffic to the intended destination. Should anonymity be desired, the server might send the traffic through multiple proxies before sending it to the destination. DPI is deep-packet inspection. 
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at obfuscating packet payloads. We break down approaches into four categories: encryption, randomization, mimicry, and tunneling.
Encryption
A natural first thought is that conventional encryption is already a good obfuscator. Indeed, encryption renders unintelligible the data that's encrypted. But most encryption protocols have plaintext headers in each packet payload that identify the protocol and sometimes indicate the particular application that's implementing the protocol. We've seen in Iran and China that plaintext headers contain fingerprintable parameters that can help a censor distinguish between, say, Tor's TLS implementations from non-Tor implementations. In short, just encrypting data doesn't guarantee a level of unobservability sufficient for the goal of making DPI unreliable for censors.
Randomization
If conventional encryption, like plaintext protocols, can leave exploitable fingerprints for DPI, why not randomize every byte in the packet payload? This strategy, which has been described as attempting to make network flows "look like nothing" by the obfs family of obfuscators, 8 is used by Dust and ScrambleSuit. 9,10 ScrambleSuit and the obfs methods are designed specifically for the Tor pluggable transport framework Obfsproxy.
The standard approach to randomizing a payload is to apply a stream cipher to every byte. Assuming a passive censor that doesn't have access to the stream cipher secret key, this approach makes protocol identification difficult because there are no fixed fingerprints to observe. Because stream ciphers don't provide the strong confidentiality and authenticity guarantees sought, they're typically applied on top of modern encryption methods that do.
Underlying the use of randomizing "look-likenothing" obfuscators is the assumption that censors use only blacklisting: they allow all traffic except that which conforms to an explicit set of disallowed traffic types. If censors use whitelisting, exclusively or in addition to blacklisting, then fully randomized payloads won't avoid censorship by virtue of looking like no actual network traffic.
Mimicry
To address whitelisting censors, a class of obfuscation methods attempt to evade censorship by masquerading as a whitelisted protocol. Loosely, rather than trying to look like nothing, mimicry-based obfuscators try to make packet payloads look like something that they're not-specifically, something that will be identified by DPI as allowable. A common example is to make payloads look like HTTP, which is rarely blocked because of its ubiquity. Mimicry in the context of anticensorship originates with the Tor project prepending HTTP headers to Tor packets, 8 though mimicry can be thought of as steganography against a particular type of adversary (DPI systems). StegoTorus and SkypeMorph, for example, attempted to use steganographic approaches to look like HTTP and Skype traffic, respectively. 11, 12 Unfortunately, they have prohibitively poor performance.
A minimalist but flexible approach to mimicry can be found in format-transforming encryption (FTE). 13 As implemented in Tor, uProxy, and elsewhere, FTE lets programmers use regular expressions to specify the format of ciphertexts. Because DPI also uses regular expressions, one can often precisely force misclassification of the protocol. Mimicry obfuscators attempt to make packet payloads look like a particular "cover" protocol but don't actually use an implementation of the targeted cover. This means that the syntax and semantics of messages emanating from mimicry systems might deviate, often significantly, from that of messages conforming to the cover protocol. As one example, a mimicking obfuscator might produce a message purporting to be an HTTP GET after having just received a message purporting to be an HTTP GET, thereby violating proper HTTP semantics.
Tunneling
Instead of custom obfuscation implementations of mimicry that reproduce some aspects of the cover protocol, tunneling obfuscators transmit messages produced by an actual implementation of the cover protocol. Tunneling is of course not something new to obfuscation: all proxy systems use tunneling over encrypted channels. So any VPN or HTTPS proxy might be considered a tunneling obfuscator. The key difference is that tunneling obfuscators are meant to obfuscate the fact that an anticensorship tool is being used, and sometimes even obfuscate that encryption is being used. A VPN or proxy might not attempt to hide such facts.
Two challenges arise in tunneling obfuscators. The first is functional and occurs when there's a mismatch between the desired network transport semantics of the tunneled data (for instance, Tor) and the offered transport semantics of the tunneling protocol. As an example, HTTP is tuned in many ways for high bandwidth downstream and low bandwidth upstream, while someone using Tor might be uploading a large file. Or one might want to tunnel Tor over a tunneling protocol built on top of an unreliable network transport such as UDP. Because the latter disregards packet drops, one will have to work to implement logic to achieve the reliability that Tor implementations expect. Functionality must be achieved while also ensuring suitably high performance.
The second challenge is that tunneling actually might fall short of hiding the true nature of the tunneled traffic. Consider again that Iran and China distinguished Tor TLS from non-Tor TLS first-hop connections. Tor was using an actual implementation of the TLS protocol to tunnel its traffic-that is, Tor was using tunneling obfuscation. Ultimately, obfuscation designers face the challenge of ensuring that, when tunneling, they take care to match the behavior of common implementations and usage of the cover protocol.
A notable example of a tunneling obfuscator is the Tor pluggable transport Meek. 1 Meek tunnels via TLS to HTTP load balancers operated by Google, Amazon CloudFront, or Microsoft Azure. This is called domain fronting because the ostensible domain revealed at the TCP layer (and so, in the clear) is google.com, say, but the underlying encrypted request is for a domain that routes to a Meek-enabled Tor relay. (Interestingly, a similar use of domain fronting was employed by the GoAgent system and was popular in China in 2013.) As with Tor TLS, the Meek obfuscator is at pains to ensure that tunneled Tor connections to the load balancer look like conventional TLS connections to the load balancer. It's worth noting that this approach relies on an undocumented feature of load balancer implementations, and it's conceivable that companies might modify future load balancers in a way that prevents domain fronting. Table 3 summarizes a range of obfuscators that have been deployed and compares them qualitatively in terms of deployment, key exchange (should encryption be used to perform obfuscation), and performance. It also reviews attacks that have been used against them.
Seeing through Obfuscation
Can real censors detect obfuscators? Researchers have begun preliminary investigations into this question; we summarize their approaches here, focusing on passive techniques. The takeaway message from what follows is that the answer isn't yet clear.
Syntactic and Semantic Mismatch
The first intensive investigation into obfuscator detection was the work of Amir Houmansadr and his colleagues. 6 They focused on mimicry systems in particular and claimed that all such systems are fundamentally flawed because they'll never perfectly replicate all aspects of a target protocol implementation.
They looked specifically at the extent to which messages emitted by currently implemented systems abide by the proper syntax or semantics of the cover protocol. By syntax, we mean that the emitted messages are parsable as cover protocol messages-required headers are in the right places, the correct character sets are used, and so forth. Semantics refers instead to whether messages are meaningful relative to the protocol's proper functioning.
Most mimicry systems explicitly made no attempt to mimic all aspects of the cover protocol, making the search for syntactic and semantic mismatches a foregone conclusion. As examples, StegoTorus doesn't implement most of HTTP, and the packets sent when using FTE (in a way that favors performance) contain large numbers of random, unformatted bits. The authors
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show how to take advantage of such mismatches. In par ticular, they detail a number of ways to detect Stego Torus, SkypeMorph, and CensorSpoofer. None of these obfuscators were actually in use (although for reasons unrelated to security), and so these attacks were tested only against simulated standins for deployed systems. It's possible that real deployments would be more (or less!) vulnerable to their attack methods.
We also note that the authors didn't measure the col lateral damage of their tests-that is, to what extent the attacks they develop would misclassify benign cover protocol traffic as obfuscated. Subsequent work showed that some of their tests would lead to a falsepositive rate of 37 percent if naively deployed, whereas others appear effective at avoiding collateral damage. 14
Entropy Tests
The semantic and syntactic checks above won't help one identify the use of randomizing obfuscators, as these explicitly try to look like no actual protocol. Liang Wang and his colleagues evaluated the use of efficient entropy tests in the context of detecting randomizing obfuscators. 14 Their techniques focus on a small win dow of bytes occurring in the first few messages of an observed flow. The intuition for why this works is that the packets emitted by all nonobfuscated protocols always contain some plaintext headers, whereas ran domizers by definition have random data in these loca tions. Their test against obfsproxy achieved a relatively low falsepositive rate of only 0.2 percent when used against nonobfuscated network traces collected from a university campus. Whether this constitutes a suffi ciently small falsepositive rate in practice is both con text dependent and unclear.
Traffic Analysis
Even without parsing packet payloads to exploit the actual byte values being carried, obfuscatorproduced traffic might exhibit packet lengths, interpacket timings, and directional traffic patterns that deviate from the background network traffic. Using such metadata to infer information about communications is traffic analysis. One example of deviant traffic behavior arises in Meek. Conventionally, HTTPS connections involve two message flows-one smaller upstream request (client to server) and another longer downstream message containing the requested content. However, with Meek, the client must frequently send requests to see whether new data is available. To a network DPI system, this might stand out as an uncharacteristically large number of upstream messages. The ability to exploit this by a DPI was investigated by Wang and his colleagues, whose machine learning-based approach detected Meek with a true-positive rate of 0.98 and false-positive rate of 0.0002 or less. But their detector might not be easy to use in practice as it only worked well when trained and tested on traces from the same network environment.
Fearing traffic analysis, some obfuscators include mechanisms to try to randomize metadata such as packet lengths and packet interarrival time. Such counter measures borrow techniques from the extensive literature on website fingerprinting and its countermeasures. 15 How effective these countermeasures are in the obfuscation context is unknown.
Challenges and Open Questions
So far, we've provided an overview of the rapid evolution of censorship and censorship evasion technologies in the context of network traffic obfuscation. Now 
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we turn to the many open questions and challenges that remain.
Understanding Users
Beyond anecdotes and folklore, very little is understood about the users of censorship circumvention tools, and this hamstrings the development of effective tools.
Research that takes a principled approach to understanding users and their situations could lead to significant improvements. But performing user studies in this context is particularly challenging. The use of censorship circumvention tools is illegal in some places, and in extreme cases, exposing users could put them in physical danger.
Develop guidelines for user studies. The research community might produce guidelines for performing ethical human-subject research in this space. These guidelines would do well to account for regional and cultural differences, reflect the challenge of obtaining informed consent, and perform measurement in a transparent yet privacy-sensitive way.
Perform user studies. The guidelines could be put to use in the design of ethical research studies. Key questions that might be addressed include: What makes users decide to use a system or not? How do users first learn of the availability of tools and then obtain them? What are user perceptions regarding risk, ethics, and legality of tool use? How do users react to different kinds of performance or functionality loss when using circumvention tools? How important is it to users that they be able to convincingly deny that they used a tool?
Understanding Censors
Perhaps the most important theme emerging from this article is that researchers don't yet have a clear understanding of the adversary. This prevents us from knowing whether a proposed obfuscation method is truly "broken" or targets appropriate design tradeoffs among security, performance, and usability.
Characterize "normal" traffic. Circumvention technologies depend on sensitivity to collateral damage, but at present we lack models for how normal, unobfuscated traffic appears to DPI systems. This is especially important for mimicry-based obfuscators which, by design, try to avoid detection by appearing to be normal traffic. So far, researchers have either generated synthetic datasets or, in one case, gathered traces from a university's networks. 14 The problem with synthetic traces, and even university network captures, is that they're unlikely to properly represent the wide diversity of traffic that censors observe.
One approach here would be to develop partnerships with large network operators (for instance, ISPs) to perform studies. We note that for obfuscation research, one unfortunately needs what's referred to as full-packet capture-that is, entire packet contents, including application-layer data. This could have significant privacy implications for network users, so special care is demanded. Perhaps researchers could develop new techniques for doing studies without ever storing packets, or incorporate other privacy mechanisms (for example, see "Bunker: A Privacy-Oriented Platform for Network Tracing" 16 ). This would improve the privacy of such studies and, one hopes, reduce reluctance of network operators to help perform them.
One powerful artifact of such studies would be useful models of "normal" traffic in various settings. These could be used to build more accurate simulations to support further analysis and tool testing. What would make a model "useful" isn't currently well defined.
Models of collateral damage. Clearly our threat models must account for the sensitivity of censors to collateral damage. Underlying all censorship circumvention tools is the assumption that censors want to limit collateral damage, at least to some extent. There are a number of open questions here.
First is characterizing what types of collateral damage are of concern to censors. We expect that tolerance to false positives varies from country to country, and across time within a single country. Moreover, not all collateral damage is the same: it might be that causing collateral damage of certain forms is more costly to censors in terms of political or economic repercussions. Domain fronting systems, such as CloudTransport and Meek, rely on the hope that blocking popular cloud services, for instance, those provided by Google or Amazon, is untenable. However, some countries like China have blocked such services entirely for periods of time. A methodology for systems to reason about collateral damage is clearly needed.
The challenge is for models to incorporate parameters in a way that captures informal statements of the form "the censor won't tolerate more than an n percent false-positive rate. " Few existing works attempt to measure false-positive rates methodically; thus, we have no way to state that a given technique will induce collateral damage that's intolerable to the modeled censor.
A starting point would be to build threat models parameterized by false-positive rates and standardized methods to identify network traffic. Researchers could then present receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves with their approach. ROC curves and measures, such as area under the curve (AUC), are already standard practice in machine learning, and we recommend for future-proof obfuscation mechanisms. By this we mean mechanisms that can maintain connectivity for users even in the face of adaptive censors that know the design of the system. We summarize the research directions needed to achieve this.
Develop formal foundations for obfuscation research.
Currently, there's a dearth of formal abstractions formal threat models in particular on which to lay principled foundations for obfuscation. One approach is to follow modern cryptographic theory's lead, where precise adversarial models, security goals, and syntax for primitives are primary research considerations. is approach enables clear scienti c discussion and objective comparison of systems relative to speci ed adversarial models. In short, good models are a signi cant aid in new tool development.
Unlike traditional cryptographic problems, where e cient constructions have been shown to meet very pessimistic adversarial models, the censorship circumvention se ing might bene t from more realistic models, informed and evolved by experimental evidence and measurements from the eld.
Build general frameworks. Obfuscation mechanisms have mostly been built with a particular circumvention system in mind. But obfuscation methods designed for a speci c circumvention system might not be easily adapted for another. For example, Tor is TCP based, so Tor-oriented obfuscation methods need not consider unreliable transports, but I2P and uProxy must.
To have broader impact, the obfuscation community would bene t from general libraries and frameworks. In addition to cu ing down on aggregate implementation e ort, having broadly useful obfuscation libraries could facilitate rapid rollouts of countermeasures to new a acks not every tool would need to have a di erent patch developed. Of course, building more general libraries will require community consensus on typical architectures, APIs, and protocols for negotiating which obfuscation to use.
Increase the use of encryption. Recent e orts to expand the use of standard encryption tools like TLS make it harder to perform censorship. If most of the Internet is end-to-end encrypted using TLS, then censors are harder pressed to use DPI to detect content they want to block. Indeed, we view improved censorship bringing these forms of analysis to circumvention technology development.
Accessible censorship adversary labs. Given the widespread and increasing use of commercial DPI devices, good threat models should be informed by what devices can reasonably be expected to do now and in the near future what computational tasks they can perform (regular expression matching, full parsing of packet payloads, or intensive statistical tests) and how much state they can keep (a single packet, all packets in a TCP connection, or all connections from a particular IP address). is assessment will be context dependent: it will be impacted by the volume of tra c and the assumed sensitivity to collateral damage. is suggests that a hierarchy of threat models should be developed to guide building useful systems, rather than a empting to get consensus on a single model.
A hurdle has been obtaining access to the kinds of equipment used by censors. DPI systems are expensive proprietary devices, and they come with restrictive licensing agreements that typically prevent any benchmarking. is means that researchers, even if they purchase a device, might be contractually obligated not to perform research with them. Although hardware can o en be purchased secondhand on sites like eBay, it might contain out-of-date so ware and not fully re ect the abilities of fully updated deployments. e community would bene t from a concerted e ort to overcome these hurdles, with the goal of building a widely usable censorship lab. e lab would need to obtain realistic, preferably state-of-the-art, devices with realistic con gurations. Less restrictive licensing would need to be negotiated. We might look to previous scienti c infrastructure projects for inspiration, such as PlanetLab, CloudLab, and the National Cyber Range. We envision such a lab acting as a repository for reference datasets of "normal" tra c (as discussed earlier) in addition to providing a ba ery of existing censorship tools. Ideally, the lab would support remote access for researchers.
Future-Proofi ng Obfuscation Systems
We expect that user studies and be er understanding of censors will yield signi cant insights into how to build be er circumvention systems. Eventually, our goal should be to adapt to, or even defuse, the current arms race and give developers the techniques needed A hierarchy of threat models should be developed to guide building useful systems, rather than attempting to get consensus on a single model.
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circumvention as a nice ancillary benefit to the already laudable goal of ubiquitous encryption on the Internet. However, recall our earlier warning that encryption isn't a silver bullet for censorship circumvention. Particular applications that use common encryption protocols can still be fingerprinted, often by information sent in the clear such as headers, packet sizes, and timing.
Censors are also sometimes positioned to break end-to-end security, performing man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks either by directly abusing the web's public-key infrastructure, as occurred in Turkey in 2012, 17 or by forcing clients to install root certificates that trick systems into allowing MITM proxies. The latter is common in corporate settings already, and retooling those solutions to nation-state levels is part of the threat landscape that should be considered.
Simultaneously, encryption standards could do more to support obfuscation. For example, they could encrypt more of the handshake required during connection establishment. Ideally, all bits emitted would be completely random-looking to the censor. (This is targeted by the obfs4 system.) If all TLS connections achieved this, then the entropy-based attacks discussed earlier would no longer be effective.
C ensorship circumvention technology is a relatively young field of research but already has a wide diversity of approaches and systems. This suggests the need to reflect and consolidate what's been learned and to propose open questions to facilitate the field's development.
Perhaps the most striking observation is that researchers don't yet have a clear and common model of the adversary. We also noted significant challenges to understanding users and making obfuscation systems robust to future attacks. These limitations prevent researchers from knowing whether a proposed obfuscation method is vulnerable in practice (versus just in theory) and whether a design has made appropriate tradeoffs among security, performance, and ease of use, or it's failing to address user needs.
These open questions are in large part due to a surfeit of methodological challenges that researchers in this area face. Chief among these are the difficulty of obtaining access to network traffic without violating privacy, procuring DPI systems used by censors, and performing user studies in relevant populations. Such challenges make principled progress difficult but also offer opportunities for creative workarounds.
Unfortunately, Internet censorship will be around for the foreseeable future. Researchers, activists, and governments supporting the right to unfettered information online should continue to work toward a future in which network traffic obfuscation prevails in the face of sophisticated, well-provisioned censors. This will add a critical piece to the technosocial puzzle enabling people around the world access to information. 
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